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Perspective-taking is spontaneous but
not automatic
Cathleen O’Grady1, Thom Scott-Phillips2, 3, Suilin Lavelle1 and Kenny Smith1
Abstract
Data from a range of different experimental paradigms – in particular (but not only) the dot perspective task – have
been interpreted as evidence that humans automatically track the perspective of other individuals. Results from other
studies, however, have cast doubt on this interpretation, and some researchers have suggested that phenomena that
seem like perspective-taking might instead be the products of simpler behavioural rules. The issue remains unsettled in
significant part because different schools of thought, with different theoretical perspectives, implement the experimental
tasks in subtly different ways, making direct comparisons difficult. Here, we explore the possibility that subtle differences
in experimental method explain otherwise irreconcilable findings in the literature. Across 5 experiments we show that
the classic result in the dot perspective task is not automatic (it is not purely stimulus-driven), but nor is it exclusively the
product of simple behavioural rules that do not involve mentalizing. Instead, participants do compute the perspectives of
other individuals rapidly, unconsciously and involuntarily, but only when attentional systems prompt them to do so (just
as, for instance, the visual system puts external objects into focus only as and when required). This finding prompts us
to clearly distinguish spontaneity from automaticity. Spontaneous perspective-taking may be a computationally efficient
means of navigating the social world.
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Introduction
Everyday interactions with other people seem to require
us to keep track of what those around us can see.
Actions as simple as asking a friend to hand you an
object, passing a football to a team member, or assessing
whether an oncoming pedestrian has noticed your bicycle
appear to require tracking what another individual can
see – that is, visual perspective-taking. Taking the visual
perspective of another individual is a form of mindreading,
requiring a mental representation of another person’s visual
field (Apperly 2011). However, it could be the case that
behaviours like these are guided by a less complex cognitive
process, such as directional orienting, in which an agent is
simply aware of what appears in the direction that another
individual is facing (Heyes 2014). Currently, much debate on
visual perspective-taking centres on the question of whether
results in certain visual perspective-taking tasks are better
explained by mentalizing or by submentalizing processes
such as directional orienting (Conway et al. 2017; Freundlieb
et al. 2016, 2018; Gardner et al. 2018b; Langton 2018;
Santiesteban et al. 2014; Zhao et al. 2015; Gardner et al.
2018a).
One significant reason why these empirical issues are
presently unresolved is methodological inconsistencies in the
experimental literature. Despite the fact that much of the
literature uses the same basic experimental task (see below)
there are nevertheless recurrent variations in experimental
design, making truly direct comparisons difficult. As we
detail below, one crucial difference is the presence or
absence of various prompts cueing participants to consider
perspective-taking relevant to the task. This methodological
choice is made for a variety of reasons, but especially key
are differing assumptions about whether excluding prompts
in certain tasks provides a more genuine assessment of
spontaneous or automatic perspective-taking (Conway et al.
2017; Gardner et al. 2018a,b; Santiesteban et al. 2014;
Bukowski et al. 2015). There is further inconsistency in
the use of the terms automatic and spontaneous themselves,
which are used interchangeably in some papers, hindering
clarity in the debate (Cole et al. 2016, 2017; Langton 2018;
Michael et al. 2018).
Here we address these issues. We first present a literature
review that summarises the key issues identified above,
discussing the utility of making a principled distinction
between automatic and spontaneous processes. We then
present three new preregistered studies that address the
issues directly, using the same experimental task as much
of the existing literature (the Dot Perspective Task; see
below), and two replications using alternative stimuli.
Collectively our results show that one particular variant of
the task does indeed demonstrate computation of another
individual’s perspective; that is, it involves perspective-
taking rather than directional orienting. This effect arises
rapidly and involuntarily (i.e. it is spontaneous), but it is
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not found uniformly across different task designs (i.e. it is
not automatic). The effect depends instead on whether the
perspective of the avatar (or other stimulus) is made salient
in one way or another. We further show that in another
variant of the task, effects vary depending on the stimuli
used, further corroborating the evidence that responses
are not automatic, depending instead on participants’
interpretation of the task requirements. Collectively, these
results indicate that attentional processes moderate the
deployment of perspective-taking. This finding explains
apparent inconsistencies in the literature, and suggests that
perspective-taking and directional orienting may both play a
role in responses, depending on task context.
The Dot Perspective Task
The Dot Perspective Task (DPT) requires participants to
enumerate the number of dots that appear in a scene
containing an avatar that sometimes has a different
perspective from the participant’s (see Figure 1 for detailed
description). The classic result is that participants are slower
to respond based on their own perspective when the avatar’s
perspective differs from their own (Cole et al. 2016; Conway
et al. 2017; Furlanetto et al. 2016; Nielsen et al. 2015;
Qureshi et al. 2010; Samson et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al.
2014; Surtees and Apperly 2012). This result is sufficiently
well-established that in recent years the DPT has begun to
be used to establish the presence or absence of perspective-
taking abilities in a range of different contexts, including
research on psychopathy and gender differences (Drayton
et al. 2018; Yue et al. 2017).
Figure 1. Stimuli from the original DPT (Samson et al. 2010).
The task requires participants to view a scene that includes a
human avatar and an array of dots. On every trial, participants
are told whether to take the avatar’s perspective (with the
prompt HE or SHE) or their own perspective (with the prompt
YOU). They are then shown a single digit in the middle of the
screen, followed immediately after by the scene in this figure.
They are asked to respond “Yes” or “No” depending on whether
the digit matches the number of dots in the picture. On “self”
trials, participants must respond based on the number of dots
they see in the picture. On “other” trials, they must decide
whether the digit matches the number of dots the avatar sees.
The classic result in this paradigm is that participants react
more slowly in inconsistent scenes (as pictured on the right), in
which participants can see a different number of dots than the
avatar, than in consistent scenes (left), in which they and the
avatar can see the same number of dots (Bukowski et al. 2015;
Samson et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014). This consistency
effect occurs both when participants are reporting the number
of dots the avatar can see (i.e. reaction times are slowed by the
participant’s own perspective; this is called egocentric
interference) and when participants report their own perspective
(this is called altercentric interference).
However, the interpretation of results from the DPT
is disputed. On the one hand, data from the DPT are
often cited as evidence that participants “automatically”
(Drayton et al. 2018; Furlanetto et al. 2016; Michael et al.
2018) or “spontaneously” (Gardner et al. 2018b; Samson
et al. 2010; Surtees et al. 2016; Cole et al. 2016, 2017)
compute the perspective of the avatar. This is because of
the robust finding of altercentric interference: the conflicting
perspective of the avatar slows down computation of what the
participant herself sees, even though the avatar’s perspective
is strictly irrelevant to participants’ task of responding to
the number of dots they (the participant) can see. On
the other hand, some variants of the DPT produce results
that motivate an alternate explanation, namely that the
altercentric interference effect is caused not by participants
taking the perspective of the avatar and being slowed
accordingly, but rather by the avatar serving as a directional
cue directing participants’ attention to certain dots (Cole
et al. 2016, 2017; Langton 2018; Santiesteban et al. 2014).
That is, altercentric interference may be explained not by
participants forming a representation of the avatar’s line of
sight, but rather by preferentially attending to the dots that
the avatar “points” toward.
The next section discusses the various versions of the
DPT that have been used to investigate these issues, and the
corresponding differences in task design that make the results
from various studies difficult to reconcile.
Perspective-taking or directional orienting:
Differences in task design
An early modification to the DPT investigated whether
altercentric interference would be found for stimuli that had
a direction, but no agency of their own* (Santiesteban et al.
2014). This study found altercentric interference not only for
avatars, but for arrows too, which was interpreted as evidence
that avatars (and arrows) serve as a type of directional
stimulus, prompting directional orienting rather than visual
perspective-taking itself. There might, however, be different
processes involved in each case: visual perspective-taking in
the case of the avatar, and directional orienting in the case
of the arrows (Cole et al. 2016). Indeed gaze-cueing research
suggests that, while eye gaze cues participants to a specific
location, an arrow provides a more general cue (Marotta et al.
2012).
A second series of modified DPT variants instead
manipulates what the avatar appears able to see, using either
barriers that block the dots from the avatar’s field of view,
or cartoon blindfolds or opaque goggles (Baker et al. 2016;
Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017; Furlanetto et al. 2016).
We call these “occlusion” tasks. The idea here is that if
altercentric interference is driven by directional orienting,
then it should occur whenever the number of dots the
avatar faces is lower than the overall number of dots in the
scene, even if the avatar cannot “see” the dots (e.g. due to
an occluding barrier or other method of blinding). If the
∗It is of course worth noting that the avatars in the DPT do not have agency
themselves, since they are cartoon-like representations of people rather than
actual people. But avatars do at least aim to imitate things that do have
agency, unlike e.g. arrows.
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effect is instead driven by perspective-taking, altercentric
interference should not appear when the avatar is blinded,
since the avatar cannot “see” any of the dots in either
consistent or inconsistent scenes. These tasks have produced
contradictory results, with some finding effects supportive of
the perspective-taking account (Baker et al. 2016; Furlanetto
et al. 2016) and others supporting the directional orienting
account (Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017; Langton
2018).
One possible explanation of these various contradictory
results is that these experiments differ in whether participants
are ever required to take the perspective of the avatar.
Most of the experiments in the first, pioneering DPT study
(Samson et al. 2010) required participants to answer based
on their own perspective on some trials (“self” trials),
and based on the avatar’s perspective on others (“other”
trials). We call these explicit tasks, because the avatar’s
perspective is explicitly relevant in these tasks. Explicit
tasks can can establish the presence of both egocentric and
altercentric interference: on “other” trials, explicit tasks may
demonstrate egocentric interference, or slower judgements
of the avatar’s perspective due to interference from one’s
own perspective, since they are the only tasks that require
participants to take the avatar’s perspective. On “self” trials,
explicit tasks may demonstrate altercentric interference,
or slower judgements of one’s own perspective due to
interference from the avatar’s perspective (see Figure 1).
This first DPT study (Samson et al. 2010) also included
one task (Experiment 3) in which participants respond based
only on their own perspective throughout the task. This
experiment was motivated by concerns that mixing “self”
and “other” trials may have cued participants to take the
avatar’s perspective even on trials where it was not relevant
(i.e. on “self” trials). Participants were prompted with the
cue “YOU” before every trial, and were instructed to ignore
the central stimulus. We call this as an implicit task, because
although it does not require participants to take the avatar’s
perspective as part of the task, it does overtly mention the
avatar and its perspective – whether to instruct participants
to ignore the avatar’s perspective, as in Santiesteban et al.
(2014), or to clarify for participants what the avatar can
and cannot see, as in Cole et al. (2016). These instructions,
along with the use of the word YOU as a cue on each
trial, may still serve to prompt the participants to consider
the avatar’s perspective as relevant to the task, hence the
label implicit. Implicit tasks are capable of establishing
only altercentric interference, not egocentric interference;
but altercentric interference is the effect that drives the claim
of automatic/spontaneous perspective-taking, and so is the
primary effect of interest in the DPT.
Note that the use of the terms “explicit” and “implicit” in
this sense differ slightly from their use in the wider Theory of
Mind literature, which distinguishes between explicit tasks
that require a verbal response about another individual’s
mental states, and implicit tasks that infer the presence of the
representation of another individual’s mental states based on
non-verbal responses (see e.g. San Juan and Astington 2017).
Here, we are using the terms to refer to the task instructions
and demands; that is, to describe whether participants are
explicitly or implicitly required to take the perspective of the
avatar throughout the task.
Occlusion tasks have generally opted to use either an
explicit design throughout a battery of tasks, or an implicit
design throughout. Those using explicit tasks have tended to
find evidence consistent with the perspective-taking account
(Baker et al. 2016; Furlanetto et al. 2016), while those
using implicit tasks have tended to find evidence consistent
with directional orienting (Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al.
2017; Langton 2018). One study has compared an explicit
and implicit task, but this was done within subjects, in a
substantially altered version of the DPT, making the findings
difficult to interpret (Conway et al. 2017).
One further possibility is uncued tasks, which make no
mention of perspective-taking in any of the information
given to participants, have no requirement to take the
avatar’s perspective, and no trial-by-trial “YOU” cue that
could implicitly contrast the participant’s perspective with
some other perspective. These tasks find no altercentric
interference effect, unless there are further task modifications
that draw additional attention to the avatar in some other
way (for instance, having the avatar appear up to 600 ms
before the dots in the scene) (Bukowski et al. 2015;
Gardner et al. 2018b). (In the tasks that draw attention
to the avatar in some way, results have been consistent
with both the directional orienting and perspective-taking
accounts, since these were not occlusion tasks. No existing
uncued task attempts to discriminate between these.) In
the Supplementary Information we describe a pilot study
(uncued) that reports the same pattern of results.
In sum, apparently inconsistent results across variants of
the DPT task may plausibly be due to differences in whether
the perspective of the avatar – or other stimulus, such as an
arrow – is made salient in one way or another, regardless
of whether that perspective is strictly relevant for the task.
This possibility prompts us to clearly distinguish between
automatic and spontaneous cognitive processes, as described
in the next section.
Implications for automaticity and spontaneity
Much of the experimental literature on the DPT is presented
as informing the debate on “spontaneous perspective-taking”
or “automatic perspective-taking”. These terms are not often
distinguished and sometimes used interchangeably. Few
studies discuss exactly what spontaneity and/or automaticity
entail. Where there is such discussion the most common
approach is to say that for visual perspective-taking (or
directional orienting) to be automatic or spontaneous, it
should be purely stimulus-driven (Bukowski et al. 2015;
Cole et al. 2016; Gardner et al. 2018b; Langton 2018). That
is, it should occur reflexively and mandatorily on seeing
the avatar, without any cues to participants to take the
avatar’s perspective, and without any need or motivation
on the part of the participants to consider the avatar’s
perspective relevant to the task (Cole et al. 2016; Gardner
et al. 2018b; Langton 2018). Whether these conditions are
appropriate can be disputed. For instance, some researchers
have suggested that automaticity is best conceived of not
as a binary, but rather as a matter of degree, in which
features such as goal-directedness, intentionality, control,
and purely stimulus-driven response each play a partial
role in establishing whether a process is automatic (Moors
and De Houwer 2006). Still, the more narrow definition of
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automatic as purely stimulus-driven is fairly widespread in
the DPT literature.
We suggest that automatic and spontaneous cognitive pro-
cesses should be clearly distinguished (see also Carruthers
(2017); Westra (2017)). We consider automatic processes to
be those that are reflexive and cannot be inhibited. In con-
trast, spontaneous processes are unconscious, involuntary,
and rapid, but their operation is determined by intention,
attention, or some other form of calibration. As an example
of the difference, contrast seeing in colour, which is auto-
matic, with seeing in focus, which is spontaneous: it occurs
only as and when necessary, as determined by attention.
The varying empirical results reviewed above suggest two
separate, but related, questions about visual perspective-
taking:
(i) Does the altercentric interference effect found in the
DPT provide evidence of visual perspective-taking or
directional orienting?
(ii) Does the process driving altercentric interference
(whether visual perspective-taking or directional
orienting) arise automatically, spontaneously, or
neither?
The current literature suggests that the principal effect in
the DPT is moderated by top-down appraisal of the task
context (Bukowski et al. 2015; Gardner et al. 2018b,a).
In basic uncued tasks, with no awareness of the potential
relevance of perspective-taking, there is no effect, while in
uncued tasks when attention drawn to the avatar in some way
there is an effect. In implicit tasks where there is minimal
awareness of the presence of the avatars, there tends to be a
directional orienting effect; visual perspective-taking effects
occur only when there is a requirement to actively model
the perspective of the avatars. This pattern suggests that
perspective-taking is not automatic, but may be spontaneous
– that is, occurring rapidly and involuntarily on individual
trials where the avatar’s perspective is irrelevant, but only in
an overall task where perspective-taking is relevant.
We present five experiments (three preregistered novel
experiments, two replications using different stimuli) testing
the hypothesis that the varying results reported in the
literature are a consequence of task design. We first contrast
explicit, implicit and uncued versions of the DPT in a
between-subjects design. Based on our reading of published
results, we predicted that the explicit task would show
an effect consistent with visual perspective-taking rather
than directional orienting; that the implicit task would
show directional orienting; and that the uncued task would
show no effect. Findings matching these predictions would
suggest a continuum of attention to the avatar’s perspective,
depending on motivation created by task context; and that
both visual perspective-taking and directional orienting arise
spontaneously but not automatically. We then present a series
of implicit tasks that attempt to establish the conditions under
which an altercentric effect is found in the implicit condition.
Experiment 1: explicit, implicit and uncued
Materials and methods
We constructed a new set of stimuli using photographs
of Lego figures, dubbed “Sally” and “Andrew” for ease
Figure 2. Adapted DPT stimuli using Lego figures. The upper
four images show example scenes; note that each scene that
participants saw featured a single avatar and a maximum of four
balls. The lower image shows both potential placement
positions for avatars (left or right of the central table) and all
possible ball positions (5 possible positions, maximum of two
balls in any one position).
of reference (Figure 2).† We did this in order to increase
task complexity for a planned series of experiments (not
reported here) using multiple avatars simultaneously. Unlike
the cartoon avatar used in most DPTs to date, these scenes
had the benefit of unambiguous depth in the third dimension,
and solid black barriers were used to prevent any ambiguity
in whether or not Lego figures were able to see through them.
A variety of hiding places allowed balls (our equivalent of
dots/discs) to be hidden from view of the Lego figures, even
when placed in front of them. Specifically, the balls could
appear in any of five positions: on a central table, visible to
either figure; on either side of the table, at the feet of the
Lego figure, and within view only of the figure on that side
of the table; or on either external boundary of the scene,
behind an external barrier, within view of neither figure.
Each scene featured a single Lego character, either Sally
or Andrew. Each figure could appear on either side of the
screen, along with 0 to 4 balls and a maximum of two balls
in any given location. The scenes were limited to 4 balls to
allow for subitization: that is, rapid and accurate enumeration
of low numbers of items. Trick and Pylyshyn (1994) find that
reaction times remain low for subitization of four items or
fewer.
This layout allowed for two different definitions of
perspective consistency (Figure 3). Line-of-sight consistency
captures the inconsistent/consistent distinction used in the
original DPT: line-of-sight consistent scenes are those
in which there are no balls occluded from the avatar’s
perspective; the avatar and the participant can see the same
number of balls. Line-of-sight inconsistent scenes are those
†Materials, experiment code, data and analysis scripts for all experiments
reported in this paper are available at https://osf.io/za3qd/.
O’Grady et al. 5
Figure 3. Example scenes from the four consistency conditions
capturing the differences between avatar and participant
perspectives, as well as spatial distribution.
in which the participant can see balls that are hidden from the
avatar. A second definition of consistency describes whether
the balls are in the direction that the avatar faces, regardless
of whether or not they are occluded: directionally consistent
scenes are those in which all balls are placed in the direction
the avatar faces, while directionally inconsistent scenes are
those in which balls appear behind the avatar.
Scenes may therefore be consistent by both definitions
(Avatar sees), inconsistent by both definitions (Behind
avatar), or line-of-sight inconsistent but directionally con-
sistent (Avatar faces). Line-of-sight consistent, directionally
inconsistent scenes are not logically possible. Although
previous research (Samson et al. 2010) controlled for the
spatial layout of the room, confirming that the presence of the
avatar and not merely the distance between the red dots was
driving altercentric interference, it is possible that the greater
complexity of our Lego scenes could introduce spatial arte-
facts. Specifically, scenes either have balls clustered entirely
around the central table, or include balls on the periphery
of the scene, outside the external walls. Avatar sees scenes
are necessarily central; Behind avatar scenes are necessar-
ily peripheral. Some Avatar faces scenes have balls only
around the central table, while some include peripheral balls.
Avatar faces scenes are therefore categorised further into
Avatar faces (central), allowing a comparison with Avatar
sees scenes that controls for the spatial distribution of balls
from the centre of the scene; and Avatar faces (peripheral),
allowing a spatial distribution-controlled comparison with
Behind avatar scenes.
Based on our review of the DPT literature above, we
made the following specific predictions for altercentric
interference (that is, from “self” trials only):
(i) Uncued, implicit and explicit tasks will all result in
slower RTs for scenes with dots positioned behind the
avatar, compared to dots positioned in front of, and
visible to, the avatar (that is, Behind avatar vs Avatar
sees trials). There are three possible explanations
for this effect: the spatial distribution of the scene,
directional orienting, or visual perspective-taking.
Further comparisons will discriminate between these
possibilities.
(ii) The explicit task will show visual perspective-taking
rather than directional orienting, illustrated by slower
RTs on Avatar faces (central) than Avatar sees trials;
that is, a delay when some balls are not visible
to the avatar, even when they are in the direction
that the avatar is facing. In the implicit and uncued
conditions, we predict no difference between Avatar
faces (central) and Avatar sees trials, suggesting no
visual perspective-taking in these conditions.
(iii) The implicit and explicit tasks will show directional
orienting, illustrated by slower RTs on Behind avatar
than Avatar faces (peripheral) trials. That is, trials
where all balls are in the direction the avatar is facing
should be faster than those where balls are behind
the avatar, suggesting directional orienting driving the
Behind avatar–Avatar sees effect in the implicit task,
and contributing to the effect in the explicit task. We
expect that the uncued task will show no difference
between Behind avatar and Avatar faces (peripheral)
trials, suggesting that the Behind avatar–Avatar sees
effect is driven purely by spatial distribution in this
condition.
Preregistration. The experimental design and analysis was
preregistered as part of the Open Science Framework’s
Preregistration Challenge; the timestamped plan is available
at https://osf.io/5ey6d.
Participants. Simulations based on a pilot experiment
(see SI Section 1) suggested that a sample size of
30 participants per condition would give substantially
higher than 80% power at α = 0.05 for the estimated
effect sizes, for the within-subjects variables of interest.
Ninety participants were recruited through the University of
Edinburgh Student and Graduate Employment Service, and
assigned randomly to the three between-subjects conditions:
explicit, implicit and uncued. They were compensated £4 for
their participation, which lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Data were excluded from two participants whose tasks
were interrupted by computer failure, and replaced by
data from two new participants.‡ Participants gave written
consent, including consent for anonymised data to be shared
publicly. Ethical approval was granted by the University
of Edinburgh’s School of Philosophy, Psychology and
Language Sciences Research Ethics Committee (PPLSREC),
reference number 109-1718/1.
Procedure. On each trial, participants saw a fixation cross,
followed by a one-word instruction, followed by a digit
(0–4) presented for 750 ms, finally followed by a Lego
scene accompanied by a prompt for a response. Figure 4
shows example trial sequences. In the explicit condition,
‡Note that this is a technical deviation from the preregistration, in which we
did not explicitly state that we would replace such participants.
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participants were told that their task was to judge whether
the digit they saw on each trial matched the number of balls
that could be seen in the following picture. If they saw the
word YOU before the trial (“Self” trials), they should answer
based on how many balls they could see, and if they saw the
word HE or SHE before the trial (“Other” trials), they should
answer based on how many balls the Lego figure could
see. In the implicit condition, participants were instructed
to ignore what the Lego figure could see, and answer based
only on what they could see. They were told that the word
YOU would appear before each trial in order to remind them
to answer based on their own perspective. In the uncued
condition, participants were told that their task was to judge
whether the digit matched the number of balls in the picture,
with no mention of the Lego figure. The word READY?
appeared before each trial, in order to make the trial length
identical across conditions.
Participants completed a short training session explaining
the task, followed by 32 practice trials (each followed by
feedback informing the participant whether their answer had
been correct or incorrect), and then the main task, divided
into four blocks with self-paced breaks between blocks.
On each trial, participants were presented with the cue
word (YOU/HE/SHE/READY?, depending on condition) for
750 ms, followed by a fixation cross for 750 ms, and finally
a digit between 0 and 4 for 750 ms, before the Lego scene
appeared with the words “Yes” and “No” in the bottom
corners of the screen. A two-button button box was used
to respond, with participants instructed to press the Yes-side
button for yes and the No-side button for no. The “Yes” and
“No” labels were presented on the screen to facilitate exact
replication between tasks regardless of input equipment.
The sides of these prompts were counterbalanced between
participants, with half of the participants seeing “No” on the
bottom left-hand corner of the screen throughout the task,
and the other half seeing it on the bottom right-hand corner.
This counterbalancing was done to avoid left-to-right reading
bias possibly favouring the left-hand prompt, and majority
human left hemispheric dominance possibly favouring the
right-hand prompt. Scenes timed out within 2000 ms if no
response was given, and the task moved on to the following
trial.
The manipulated within-subjects variable of interest was
the consistency between the avatar’s perspective and the
participant’s perspective. For each participant, there were
64 trials in each of the four consistency conditions (Avatar
sees, Avatar faces (central), Avatar faces (peripheral), and
Behind avatar). Additionally, a range of other constraints
were followed, balancing which avatar appeared and on
which side of the scene, the number of scenes with each
possible number of balls, the number of yes vs no answers,
and in the explicit condition, Self vs Other trials (see SI
section 2).
The experiment was implemented using PsychoPy (Peirce
2010).
Results
This design allowed the predictions detailed above to be
tested using a series of mixed effects models. All analyses
reported below are in accordance with the preregistered
analysis plan, unless otherwise noted.
Figure 4. An illustration of the trial procedure in the explicit
condition, with correct answers highlighted.
We removed training trials, filler trials (those with zero
balls), and timed-out trials (0.76%, n = 176); as per Whelan
(2008), trials in which the response RT was lower than
100 ms were also removed, on the assumption that these trials
could not be genuine responses to the stimuli (0.02%, n =
5). No trimming was conducted on higher reaction times,
given the imposed cut-off of 2000 ms on all trials. Although
Samson et al. (2010) and many subsequent DPT variants
analyse only “Yes” trials on the basis that “No” trials may
be easier to respond to, Santiesteban et al. (2014) found no
difference between “Yes” and “No” responses. We therefore
have not removed data from “No” trials and do not include
this as a variable in our analyses. Because reaction time
data deviates from the normal distribution, models used a
log transform of reaction time as the dependent variable, in
order to reduce skewing of the data and better conform to the
assumptions of the model (Baayen and Milin 2010).
A binomial logistic regression analysis of error rates in a
pilot task (reported in the Supplementary Information) failed
to converge, presumably due to a lack of data, since error
rates in the DPT are extremely low. We therefore removed
trials with erroneous responses (4.2%, n = 959), but did not
analyse them due to a lack of statistical power.
Because we were interested in altercentric interference,
all “Other” trials were removed in the explicit condition
(recall that the definition of implicit and uncued conditions
is that there are no “Other” trials).§ This means that in all
conditions, we are looking only at participants’ responses
where they are evaluating whether the digit they were
presented with matches the number of balls they can
see. Any interference effects will therefore be altercentric
interference, i.e. due to inability to suppress the avatar’s
perspective when that perspective is irrelevant on the trial at
hand.
The explicit, implicit and uncued tasks were the same
length to avoid differing fatigue effects between conditions,
which halved the number of trials available for analysis in
the explicit task: 3607 explicit trials vs. 7235 implicit and
§This step was included in the preregistered analysis script, and is
necessitated by the experiment design, but was erroneously omitted from
the preregistration free-text description of the analysis.
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7396 uncued.¶ Given that all analyses were within-subjects
in a particular condition and that the power analysis showed
sufficient statistical power for this number of trials in the
explicit condition, we see no reason that this could have
accounted for any differences between conditions. We had no
theoretically motivated predictions for Other trials, and these
trials were therefore not analysed in order to limit researcher
degrees of freedom in the analysis (see Simmons et al. (2011)
for discussion of the problems associated with researcher
degrees of freedom).
We used lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) and afex (Singmann
et al. 2017) to perform a series of mixed effects regression
analyses on the log-transformed reaction times (logRT).
Mixed-effects models were used rather than the ANOVA
used in previous experiments to avoid the necessity of
averaging across observations for each participant, and to
account for random effects – that is, the variance associated
with different images as well as different participants. We
used the standard p < .05 criterion for determining where
effects were significant, with p-values obtained using model
comparison (likelihood ratio tests) using the mixed()
function in the afex package (Singmann et al. 2017) in R
({R Core Team} 2015).
Model 1: Are Behind avatar scenes slower than Avatar
sees scenes? We predicted that RTs in Avatar sees scenes
(where the avatar’s perspective matched the participant’s)
and in Behind avatar scenes (where the avatar’s perspective
mismatches the participant’s, under both line-of-sight or
directional accounts) should differ (specifically, RTs in
Avatar sees scenes should be faster) in all three tasks
(explicit, implicit and uncued), although possibly for
different reasons, to be unpicked in subsequent analyses.
In order to test this prediction, we ran an analysis on the
data from Avatar sees and Behind avatar trials. Consistency
and Condition (explicit vs implicit vs uncued) were sum-
coded and entered as fixed effects, with interaction term,
into the model. The sum coding for condition resulted in
comparisons of explicit vs implicit, and implicit vs uncued.
As differences in overall RT between the three conditions
were not relevant to our predictions and had no theoretically-
motivated hypotheses about these differences, the results of
these slopes are not reported. Random intercepts for images
and participants were specified, as well as by-participant
random slopes for the effect of consistency.||
The model (Table 1) showed an effect of Consistency,
suggesting that Behind avatar trials were approximately
44.22 ms slower on average than Avatar sees trials. There
was no interaction between Condition and Consistency,
implying that all three conditions showed the same effect,
with a 59.89 ms difference in the explicit condition, 38.93 ms
in the implicit condition, and 35.66 ms in the uncued
condition (Figure 5).
In all conditions, then, Avatar sees trials were associ-
ated with faster RTs than Behind avatar trials, matching
our prediction. However, the cause of this effect (visual
perspective-taking, directional orienting, or spatial distribu-
tion) is unclear.
Model 2: Is there a mentalizing effect in the explicit
condition? We limited our data to Avatar sees and Avatar
faces (central) trials – recall that in Avatar faces (central)
trials, all balls in the scene are located centrally, but
the participant and the avatar have distinct line-of-sight
perspectives, i.e. some balls are ‘hidden’ from the avatar
behind the central table. Otherwise, the model was identical
to Model 1. The model (Table 2) showed no significant
effect of Consistency, but a significant interaction between
Condition and Consistency. Planned pairwise comparisons
showed that Avatar faces (central) trials were, on average,
27.79 ms slower than Avatar sees trials in the explicit
condition, but showed no significant difference in the
implicit or uncued conditions (Figure 6). This matches
our prediction, and suggests visual perspective-taking in
the explicit condition, and either a directional orienting or
a spatial-distribution effect underlying the results for the
implicit and uncued conditions in Model 1.
Model 3: Is there a directional orienting effect in the implicit
condition? We limited our data to Avatar faces (peripheral)
and Behind avatar trials – recall that in Avatar faces
(peripheral) trials the participant and the avatar have distinct
line-of-sight perspectives, i.e. some balls are ‘hidden’ from
the avatar in a peripheral position, in the direction that
the avatar is facing but behind one of the outer barriers;
in Behind avatar trials some balls are ‘hidden’ behind the
avatar, again in a peripheral position. The model (Table 3,
model structure and coding as per previous analyses) showed
no effect of consistency and no interaction between condition
and consistency.** Planned pairwise comparisons showed
a significant effect for explicit but not implicit or uncued
conditions. Note however that given the omnibus model
showed no interaction, the significant effect (24.24 ms) in the
model analysing the explicit condition only should be treated
with caution (Figure 7).
There is therefore (somewhat tentative) evidence matching
our predictions for the explicit condition (where we expected
a directional orienting component to visual perspective-
taking, here indicated by participants responding faster when
balls were in the direction the avatar was facing, even
though they were occluded from the avatar’s line of sight).
These results also match our prediction for the uncued
condition, where we predicted no effect of the avatar, and
a Behind avatar–Avatar sees altercentric interference effect
(see Model 1) driven entirely by central vs peripheral
distributions of the balls. However, we do not find evidence
matching our prediction for the implicit condition, where
we predicted altercentric interference in this model, driven
by directional orienting. Rather, our results suggest that our
¶A reviewer suggested an exploratory analysis using only the first half of
the trials from the implicit and uncued tasks, in order to confirm whether
diminishing effects in the implicit and uncued tasks may explain the results
reported. This analysis, using the trials only from the first two blocks of
the implicit and uncued tasks, produces the same pattern of results as the
preregistered analysis reported here, i.e. the same comparisons produced
similarly significant or null results. One minor exception is noted in the
results of Model 3. The script for this exploratory analysis is available at
osf.io/za3qd/.
‖Model syntax:
logRT ~ Condition*Consistency +
(1+Consistency|Participant) + (1|Image)
∗∗The exploratory analysis mentioned above using trials from only the
first two blocks in the implicit and uncued conditions showed a consistent
interaction between condition and consistency, p = 0.03.
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Table 1. Results of Experiment 1, Model 1: Avatar sees vs Behind avatar
Model Slope β SE χ2 df p










Consistency (explicit) 0.044 0.008 22.62 1 < .001***
Consistency (implicit) 0.034 0.005 32.71 1 < .001***
Consistency (uncued) 0.032 0.006 24.70 1 < .001***
Figure 5. Effects of Experiment 1, Model 1: Avatar sees vs Behind avatar. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar sees
conditions, for explicit, implicit and uncued tasks; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the mean of the by-participant means, and
significance annotations on the plots reflect the planned comparisons showing the effect of consistency for each condition. (B) Each
individual participant’s difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar sees RT; lines extending above 0 on the y-axis
indicate that the participant was slower in Behind avatar than in Avatar sees trials (i.e. exhibited an altercentric interference-like
effect), while lines extending below 0 indicate that the participant was slower in Avatar sees than in Behind avatar trials. Mean
reaction time is higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Behind avatar trials in all three conditions (A); a substantial
majority of participants in all three conditions show this effect (B).
Table 2. Results of Experiment 1, Model 2: Avatar sees vs Avatar faces
Model Slope β SE χ2 df p










Consistency (explicit) 0.021 0.009 4.93 1 .03*
Consistency (implicit) −0.005 0.004 1.10 1 .29
Consistency (uncued) −0.003 0.005 0.48 1 .49
implicit and uncued conditions behave similarly, with the
only effects we see being driven by the spatial distribution
of the balls, with slower responses to scenes featuring balls
in the periphery of the scene.
Discussion
These results support our hypothesis that the requirement
to take the avatar’s perspective on some trials results in
visual perspective-taking; and that differences in task design
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Figure 6. Effects of Experiment 1, Model 2: Avatar sees vs Avatar faces. (A) Mean RT for Avatar faces (central) and Avatar sees
conditions, for explicit, implicit and uncued conditions; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the mean of the by-participant means. (B)
Each individual participant’s difference between mean Avatar sees RT and mean Avatar faces (central) RT. Mean reaction time is
higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Avatar faces (central) trials in the explicit condition, but not in the implicit or uncued
conditions (A); a substantial majority of participants in the explicit condition, but not in the implicit or uncued conditions, show this
effect (B).
Table 3. Results of Experiment 1, Model 3: Avatar faces (peripheral) vs Behind avatar
Model Slope β SE χ2 df p










Consistency (explicit) 0.018 0.007 5.45 1 .02*
Consistency (implicit) 0.004 0.006 0.45 1 .50
Consistency (uncued) 0.004 0.005 0.58 1 .44
or framing explain apparently conflicting results in the
literature. We can manipulate the presence/absence of an
altercentric interference effect by switching between an
explicit task and implicit or uncued tasks.
In the explicit task, Avatar sees trials were 59.89 ms faster
than Behind avatar trials, suggesting a spatial, perspective-
taking, or directional orienting effect, or some combination
of the three; Avatar sees trials were 27.79 ms faster than
Avatar faces (central) trials, suggesting perspective-taking;
and Avatar faces (peripheral) trials were 24.24 ms faster than
Behind avatar trials, suggesting directional orienting. The
considerably larger effect in Behind avatar vs Avatar sees
suggests that the processes may be summative; that is, with
both the distribution of balls from the centre of the scene
and the avatar’s perspective causing individual delays that
result in a larger overall delay. The evidence for directional
orienting (although this evidence is tentative, given the lack
of omnibus effect in this model) suggests that directional
orienting may play a role in perspective-taking, or otherwise
operate in tandem with it, perhaps as a first visual sweep of a
scene. The precise interaction of these varying effects would
be a useful subject for future research.
The results are coherent with previous research using
explicit and uncued tasks, but conflict with several studies
that find altercentric interference in implicit tasks (Samson
et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014; Langton 2018), likely
driven by directional orienting (Cole et al. 2016; Conway
et al. 2017).
A potentially important difference between our Lego
stimuli and standard DPT stimuli is the positioning of
the avatar. Previous implicit tasks (Samson et al. 2010;
Santiesteban et al. 2014; Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al.
2017; Langton 2018) have placed the avatar in the centre
of the screen, preceded by a fixation cross and trial-by-trial
instructions in the centre of the screen. Our stimuli position
the avatar off-centre, preceded by the fixation cross and trial-
by-trial instructions in the centre of the screen. Given the
literature suggesting that additional attention drawn to the
avatar induces an altercentric effect even on uncued tasks
(Bukowski et al. 2015; Gardner et al. 2018b), it is possible
that previous implicit tasks have drawn additional attention
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Figure 7. Effects of Experiment 1, Model 3: Avatar faces (peripheral) vs Behind avatar. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar
faces (peripheral) conditions, for explicit, implicit and uncued conditions; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the mean of the
by-participant means. (B) Each individual participant’s difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar faces
(peripheral) RT. Mean reaction time is higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Avatar faces (peripheral) trials in the explicit
condition, but not in the implicit or uncued conditions (A); a small majority of participants in the explicit condition, but not in the
implicit or uncued conditions, show this effect (B).
to the avatar through the placement of the fixation cross and
instructions over the spot where the avatar will appear (see
e.g. Bukowski et al. (2015)).
We therefore conducted a second preregistered implicit
task, identical to the implicit condition in Experiment 1 but
with the fixation cross and trial-by-trial instructions (i.e. the
text “YOU” and the digit to be confirmed) placed directly
over the point on the screen where the avatar will appear.
We predicted that we would find the expected Avatar faces
(peripheral) vs Behind avatar altercentric interference in
this condition. This would suggest that attention must be
drawn directly to the avatar on a trial-by-trial basis in order
to induce directional orienting, implying that neither visual
perspective-taking nor directional orienting is automatic;
rather, they appear in response to ongoing cues regarding the
avatar’s relevance to the task.
Experiment 2: salience of avatars
Materials and methods
The same stimuli were used as for Experiment 1.
Preregistration. The experimental design and analysis was
preregistered as part of the Open Science Framework’s
Preregistration Challenge; the timestamped plan is available
at https://osf.io/dk86n.
Participants. Simulations based on Experiment 1 suggested
that a sample size of 30 participants per condition would
give substantially higher than 80% power at α = 0.05 for
the estimated effect sizes, for the within-subjects variables
of interest. Thirty further participants were recruited
through the University of Edinburgh Student and Graduate
Employment Service. They were compensated £4 for
their participation, which lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Data were excluded from one participant whose task was
interrupted by computer failure, and replaced by data from a
new participant. Participants gave written consent, including
consent for anonymised data to be shared publicly. Ethical
approval was granted by the University of Edinburgh’s
PPLSREC, reference number 188-1718/1.
Procedure. This task used the same procedure and task
design as the implicit condition in Experiment 1. Fixation
crosses and pre-trial instructions (the appearance of the word
YOU and the digit between 0 and 4) were changed to appear
centred over the position in which the face of the Lego
character would appear in the following scene, rather than
appearing centrally on the screen.
Results
We applied the data exclusions and transformations
described in Experiment 1, removing timed-out trials
(0.49%, n = 38) and erroneous responses (3.36%, n = 257).
There were no responses below 100 ms.
Following our preregistered analysis plan, data limited
to the three relevant comparisons (Behind avatar vs Avatar
sees, Avatar faces (central) vs Avatar sees, and Avatar faces
(peripheral) vs Behind avatar) were modelled using three
models identical to the pairwise comparisons for the implicit
condition in Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, and as predicted, the models showed a
significant difference between Avatar sees and Behind avatar
(35.96 ms), and no significant difference between Avatar
faces (central) and Avatar sees trials (−1.55 ms, see Table
4). However, contrary to our predictions, there was also no
significant difference between Avatar faces (peripheral) and
Behind avatar trials, at 1.43 ms (Figure 8). This suggests that
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there was no directional orienting effect in this task, and that
the difference between Avatar sees and Behind avatar trials
was driven by the spatial distribution of the balls.
Discussion
These results do not support the hypothesis that directional
orienting played any role in this implicit task. These results
continue to conflict with findings of consistency effects in
implicit tasks (Samson et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014;
Langton 2018; Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017).
One possible explanation for this could be the complexity
of the scene. The original DPT used a simple scene
consisting only of the avatar in a room, with an array of
dots. Occlusion tasks have used a single avatar that appeared
in a consistent position, with up to three balls and one or
two barriers (Baker et al. 2016; Cole et al. 2016) or another
method of blinding that added a single element to the existing
scene, such as goggles or a telescope (Conway et al. 2017;
Furlanetto et al. 2016). It may be that the Lego stimuli, with
three barriers, two possible avatars appearing in two different
places, and up to four balls, increased the scene complexity
to the extent that participants’ strategies to complete the
task changed substantially. That is, it may be the case that
participants were best able to respond quickly and accurately
to each trial by ignoring the perspective of the on-screen
character – a strategy that would not be possible in an explicit
task (explaining the results in Experiment 1) but would be
possible in implicit and uncued tasks.
To explore the possibility of scene complexity driving the
null results in these implicit tasks, we conducted a further
preregistered implicit task, simplifying the Lego stimuli
to scenes equivalent to those in the original DPT. These
scenes consisted of a central figure, with balls level with the
character’s gaze, positioned either in front of or behind the
character. Based on our reading of the extant literature, we
predicted that scene complexity would explain the lack of
altercentric effect on implicit tasks in Experiments 1 and 2,
i.e. that there would be an altercentric effect with simplified
stimuli.
Because these simplified stimuli do not incorporate any
barriers that distinguish between Avatar sees and Avatar
faces, they are not be able to provide evidence for whether
any altercentric effect found in this task is better explained
by perspective-taking or by directional orienting. However,
the results of this task should help to explain the unexpected
null results for directional orienting in the implicit task in
Experiment 1, and in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3: Reducing the visual
complexity of the scene
Materials and methods
The images used in Experiment 1 and 2 were digitally edited
to match the layout of the original DPT stimuli (Figure
9). Each Lego character appeared centrally on the screen,
facing either left or right, with up to two balls in each
scene. The balls, which floated at the height of the gaze of
the Lego character, could appear in front of the character,
behind it, or both in front and behind. As in Experiment
2, participants were instructed to ignore the perspective of
the Lego character, and the word YOU appeared before each
trial. The fixation cross and pre-trial instructions appeared
over the position where the face of the Lego character would
appear.
Preregistration. The experimental design and analysis was
preregistered as part of the Open Science Framework’s
Preregistration Challenge; the timestamped plan is available
at https://osf.io/hr98w.
Participants. Sample size calculation was based on the same
simulation method as Experiment 2. Thirty participants were
recruited through the University of Edinburgh Student and
Graduate Employment Service. They were compensated
£4 for their participation, which lasted approximately 30
minutes. Participants gave written consent, including consent
for anonymised data to be shared publicly. Ethical approval
was granted by the University of Edinburgh’s PPLSREC,
reference number 188-1718/1.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was used, with
some differences. Participants completed 16 practice trials,
followed by 192 test trials: 96 in which the avatar could see
the same number of balls as the participant (Avatar sees) and
96 in which at least one ball was concealed behind the avatar
(Behind avatar). Up to two balls appeared in any given scene.
Avatar, yes/no response, and number of balls were balanced
across trials (see SI Section 3).
Results
We applied the data exclusions and transformations
described in Experiment 1, removing timed-out trials
(0.30%, n = 17), erroneous responses (2.25%, n = 129), and
the single trial with a response below 100 ms (0.02%).
Following our preregistered analysis plan, a mixed effects
regression was used to compare the log-transformed reaction
times for Avatar sees trials compared to Behind avatar trials.
Consistency was sum-coded and entered as a fixed effect, and
random intercepts for images and participants were specified,
as well as by-participant random slopes for the effect of
Consistency. Contrary to our prediction, the model showed
no difference between Avatar faces and Behind avatar trials,
at an estimated −2.60 ms (Table 5, Figure 10). This suggests
(alongside the results of Experiments 1 and 2) an absence of
any directional orienting in our implicit DPT. This is contrary
to the findings of several existing studies (Samson et al. 2010;
Santiesteban et al. 2014; Langton 2018; Cole et al. 2016;
Conway et al. 2017).
Discussion
This task found no evidence of difference in RT between
Behind avatar and Avatar sees in an implicit task, contrasting
with the results of Experiments 1 and 2. This contrast
may be explained by differences in the spatial distribution
of the balls: in Experiments 1 and 2, Avatar sees trials
all had balls clustered in the centre of the screen, while
Behind avatar trials had balls on the periphery of the scene.
In Experiment 3, these two conditions had balls evenly
placed from the centre of the screen. The lack of effect in
Experiment 3, with balls evenly distributed from the centre
of the scene in these two conditions, therefore contributes to
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Figure 8. Results of Experiment 2. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar sees conditions; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the
mean of the by-participant means. (B) Each individual participant’s difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar
sees RT. Mean reaction time is higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Behind avatar trials (A); a majority of participants
show this effect (B). However, there is no difference in RT between Avatar sees and Avatar faces (central) (C, D) or Behind avatar
and Avatar faces (peripheral) (E, F).
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Table 4. Results of Experiment 2
Slope β SE χ2 df p
Behind avatar vs Avatar sees 0.028 0.005 23.72 1 < .001***
Avatar faces (central) vs Avatar sees −0.001 0.005 0.07 1 .80
Behind avatar vs Avatar faces (peripheral) 0.001 0.006 0.04 1 .84
Figure 9. Lego stimuli adapted to match original DPT scene
layout. Each scene consists of a single avatar and up to two
balls, which can appear in front of or behind the avatar.
Table 5. Results of Experiment 3
Slope β SE χ2 df p
Behind avatar vs
Avatar sees
−0.002 0.003 0.43 1 .51
the evidence that this effect was driven by spatial distribution
in Experiments 1 and 2.
The difference between the null result in Experiment 3 and
the altercentric effect found in several implicit tasks (Samson
et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014; Langton 2018; Cole
et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017) raises the possibility that
there is an important difference between the Lego stimuli
and the avatars used in previous tasks. While we find this
surprising, it may be due to unanticipated differences in the
willingness of participants to accept Lego avatars vs cartoon
avatars as having a perspective. Given that many participants
are likely to have interacted with Lego characters as objects,
but all would encounter the avatars for the first time in the
context of the experiment, one possibility is that participants
are more inclined to consider the Lego characters as objects
but the cartoon-like avatars in the standard DPT stimuli
as agents. The greater realism of the standard avatars may
also contribute to a heightened perception of agency. We
therefore ran a second simplified task using the original DPT
stimuli, otherwise identical to Experiment 3. Because this
was simply a replication of Experiment 3 using different
stimuli, it was not preregistered separately, as all other details
of the preregistration were the same.
Experiment 4: original stimuli
Materials and methods
The materials and methods for Experiment 3 were re-used,
with original DPT stimuli instead of Lego stimuli. The
images were sized so that the on-screen characters were the
same height, and the characters’ heads in the same position
on the screen, as the Lego characters in Experiment 3.
Participants. Thirty participants were recruited through the
University of Edinburgh Student and Graduate Employment
Service. They were compensated £4 for their participation,
Table 6. Results of Experiment 4
Slope β SE χ2 df p
Behind avatar vs
Avatar sees
0.010 0.004 7.05 1 .008**
which lasted approximately 30 minutes. Participants gave
written consent, including consent for anonymised data to
be shared publicly. Ethical approval was granted by the
University of Edinburgh’s PPLSREC, reference number 188-
1718/1.
Procedure. This task used the same procedure and task
design as Experiment 3.
Results
We applied the data exclusions and transformations
described in Experiment 1, removing timed-out trials
(0.24%, n = 14) and erroneous responses (2.98%, n = 171).
There were no responses below 100 ms.
The data were analysed using a model identical to that
used in Experiment 3. The results showed a significant
difference between Behind avatar and Avatar sees trials, at
11.30 ms (Table 6). Note that this is a substantially smaller
effect than other implicit tasks using these stimuli: 21 ms
(Samson et al. (2010), Experiment 3); 35.4 ms (Santiesteban
et al. (2014), Experiment 2); approximately 40 ms (Cole et al.
2016); 35 ms (Conway et al. (2017), Experiment 1). We
conducted a further exploratory model comparing reaction
times across the two experiments, with Consistency and
Stimulus entered as fixed effects (with interaction term)
and the same random effects structure as the basic model.
This model revealed a significant Consistency x Stimulus
interaction, providing further evidence of a consistency
effect with the original stimuli, but not with the Lego stimuli
(Table 7, Figure 11).
Discussion
These results suggest that, remarkably, the stimuli them-
selves play a role in producing an altercentric effect. The
lack of an effect in the implicit tasks in Experiments 1, 2
and 3 appears to be due to some difference between the
Lego stimuli and the original stimuli, suggesting that the
Lego stimuli do not result in either directional orienting or
perspective-taking without additional direction to take the
character’s perspective. It is possible that there are features
of the scenes other than the avatars themselves driving this
difference (for instance, the brightness of the colours; the
overlap of balls in the Lego scenes compared to the spacing
of the spacing of discs in the original stimuli; or the lack of a
blue background room in the Lego scenes). A reviewer sug-
gests that an alternative explanation is a difference between
the directional features of Lego and cartoon avatars. That
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Figure 10. Results of Experiment 3. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar sees conditions; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the
mean of the by-participant means. (B) Each individual participant’s difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar
sees RT. Mean reaction time is not significantly different between the two conditions.
Table 7. Lego vs original stimuli
Slope β SE χ2 df p
Original vs Lego −0.011 0.027 0.18 1 .67
Behind avatar vs Avatar sees 0.004 0.003 2.34 1 .13
Interaction 0.006 0.003 5.83 1 .02*
Figure 11. Comparison of effects in Experiments 3 and 4. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar sees conditions for both Lego
and original stimuli; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the mean of the by-participant means. (B) Each individual participant’s
difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar sees RT for both Lego and original stimuli. Mean reaction time is
higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Behind avatar trials for the original stimuli only (A); a majority of participants in this
condition show this effect (B).
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is, the original avatars may provide more cues for the front
and back of the body compared to the Lego avatars: they
have torsos with a clear front and back shape, and faces
with humanoid profiles, compared to the flat faces and body
shape of the Lego pieces. Since non-humanoid stimuli have
resulted in an altercentric effect (Santiesteban et al. 2014)
in an implicit task, the directional cueing properties of the
stimuli may play an important role.
Yet another explanation could be differences in attribution
of agency to the Lego avatars compared to the cartoon
avatars. This could be due to participants’ experience of Lego
characters as non-agentive objects in the real world, although
Lego figures have been shown to be processed as animate
in at least some circumstances (LaPointe et al. 2016); or it
may be due to intrinsic properties of the images – that is,
the greater realism of the cartoon avatars, with near-human
proportions, body shape, and facial projections.
Altercentric interference appears to be a robust effect in a
wide range of simple DPT variants, and has even been found
in more complex scene layouts with non-standard avatars
(Baker et al. 2016; Mattan et al. 2015). The unexpected
lack of altercentric interference in Experiments 1, 2 and 3
can nonetheless be reconciled with the wider literature. The
DPT variants that have used non-standard avatars have been
explicit, and our Experiment 1 using Lego figures suggests
that an explicit task may be sufficient to drive perspective-
taking. Implicit tasks make up a limited sub-section of
the DPT literature, and all use the standard avatar, or the
standard avatar with minor modifications such as a blindfold
or barrier (Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017; Samson
et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014). There are two notable
exceptions. First, Langton (2018) uses photographs of people
in an implicit occlusion task, finding results consistent with
directional orienting. This is coherent with both explanations
discussed above; that is, that a photograph of a human
would provide greater directional cues or clearer evidence
of agentiveness than Lego figures in the same way that
humanoid avatars would. Langton (2018) also uses live
human experimenters in an uncued task that has a substantial
delay between the orientation of the experimenter and the
appearance of dots; as this is analogous to other uncued
tasks that manipulate stimulus onset asynchrony (Gardner
et al. 2018b; Bukowski et al. 2015), the finding of directional
orienting in this task is not surprising. Second, Santiesteban
et al. (2014) find an altercentric effect on an implicit task
using arrows as stimuli; as discussed above, this is consistent
with the explanation that sufficient directional cueing in a
stimulus may be sufficient to trigger directional orienting.
These results contribute to the evidence suggesting that,
while the altercentric effect may be widely replicated, it
is nonetheless surprisingly sensitive to small differences
in task design that prompt attention to the avatar and the
relevance of its perspective. Prompts hinting at the relevance
of certain kinds of agentive stimuli, such as discussion
of the avatar’s perspective and the inclusion of the YOU
cue on every trial, may produce the altercentric effect in
implicit tasks (Samson et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014;
Langton 2018; Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017); while
other measures drawing attention to the avatar, such as
the appearance of the avatar before the dots, may achieve
the same effect (Bukowski et al. 2015; Gardner et al.
2018b). The results from Experiment 4 reported here suggest
that the perception of agency of the avatar may be an
alternative method of drawing attention to the avatar. They
also provide further evidence against the automaticity of
either a perspective-taking or directional orienting effect in
the DPT, but combined with the results of an explicit task
found in Experiment 1, suggest that ongoing attention drawn
to the avatar leads to a rapid, involuntary (spontaneous)
perspective-taking effect.
The simplified scene design used in Experiment 4 makes
it impossible to determine whether the altercentric effect
we observe here represents perspective-taking or directional
orienting. This distinction requires an occlusion task, and
these results suggest that the implicit occlusion tasks in
Experiments 1 and 2 may have produced null results because
of the use of Lego stimuli. We therefore conducted an
implicit occlusion task using the original DPT avatars, to
establish whether the effect found in Experiment 4 is best
explained by directional orienting or perspective-taking; and
whether the null results in the implicit tasks of Experiments 1
and 2 can be attributed to the stimuli used.
Experiment 5: occlusion task with original
stimuli
Materials and methods
The original DPT stimuli were edited to create barriers in
the same positions as in the Lego stimuli (see Figure 12).
Because the new scene layout required dots to be displayed in
positions other than on a flat wall, floating red orbs were used
instead of the red discs used in the original DPT. A colour
picking tool was used to create the colour for the orbs, and
shadows were added to create depth. They were positioned
within the eyeline of the avatars, in the same positions as in
the Lego stimuli.
Because this task differed from Experiment 2 only in
images used, and in the position of the fixation crosses and
pre-trial instructions, it was not preregistered separately, as
all other details of the preregistration were the same.
Participants. We used the same sample size as in
Experiments 1 to 4. Thirty participants were recruited
through the University of Edinburgh Student and Graduate
Employment Service. They were compensated £4 for
their participation, which lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Data were excluded from one participant whose task was
interrupted by disconnection of the response box, and one
participant who had participated in an earlier DPT. Data from
these two participants was replaced by new participants.
Participants gave written consent, including consent for
anonymised data to be shared publicly. Ethical approval
was granted by the University of Edinburgh’s PPLSREC,
reference number 188-1718/2.
Procedure. This task used the same procedure and task
design as the implicit condition in Experiment 1.
Results
We applied the data exclusions and transformations
described in Experiment 1, removing timed-out trials
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Figure 12. Occlusion task using avatars from the original DPT.
The upper four images show example scenes; note that each
scene that participants saw featured a single avatar and a
maximum of four balls. The lower image shows both potential
placement positions for avatars (left or right of the central table)
and all possible ball positions (5 possible positions, maximum of
two balls in any one position, and maximum of four balls per
scene).
(0.40%, n = 31) and erroneous responses (2.51%, n = 192).
There were no responses below 100 ms.
Following the analysis used in Experiments 1 and 2, data
limited to the three relevant comparisons (Behind avatar vs
Avatar sees, Avatar faces (central) vs Avatar sees, and Avatar
faces (peripheral) vs Behind avatar) were modelled using
three models identical to those used in Experiment 2.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, and as predicted, the
models showed a significant difference between Avatar
sees and Behind avatar (23.88 ms), and no significant
difference between Avatar faces (central) and Avatar sees
trials (−0.76 ms, see Table 8). However, contrary to our
predictions, there was also no significant difference between
Avatar faces (peripheral) and Behind avatar trials, at 3.31 ms
(Figure 13). This suggests that there was no directional
orienting effect in this task, and that the difference between
Avatar sees and Behind avatar trials was driven by the spatial
distribution of the balls.
Discussion
These results do not support the hypothesis that directional
orienting played any role in this implicit task. This continues
to conflict with findings of altercentric effects in implicit
tasks (Samson et al. 2010; Santiesteban et al. 2014; Langton
2018; Cole et al. 2016; Conway et al. 2017), and is difficult
to explain. One important difference between Experiment 5
and other implicit tasks is the visual complexity of the
scene: where other implicit tasks have used an avatar in
a consistent position within the scene, we have used two
avatars in two possible positions; and where previous tasks
have used goggles, a telescope, a single barrier, or a pair
of barriers (one behind and one in front of the avatar), we
have three different barriers in our scene, two of which are in
front of the avatar. The addition of the second barrier, and
the distance between the avatar and any balls behind this
barrier on the periphery of the scene, may be sufficient to
prevent directional orienting. The visual complexity of this
scene design may therefore simply be too high for directional
orienting to play a role in participants’ comprehension of
each image.
It would be instructive to replicate Experiment 1 (explicit,
implicit and uncued conditions) using a range of different
stimuli, including a simple screen with a window that may
be open or closed (Cole et al. 2016), a scene with more
realistic depth in the third dimension but still only one
barrier (Baker et al. 2016), pictures of humans or human
experimenters (Langton 2018), and alternative occlusion
methods such as opaque goggles (Conway et al. 2017;
Furlanetto et al. 2016). Further manipulations such as colour
saturation and the spacing of dots may also be useful.
It is clear that properties of the stimuli affect results in
the DPT in a variety of ways, and exploring these effects
systematically would greatly clarify the nature and triggering
conditions of the altercentric effect. Given the clear range
of individual participant differences in responses to the
tasks, it may also be the case that much of the DPT
literature is underpowered and suffers from sampling error;
further research into the individual differences underlying
participant responses would be valuable.
The results of Experiment 5 yield no further evidence on
whether perspective-taking or directional orienting underlies
the altercentric effect found in Experiment 4. It may be
the case that the visual complexity of this occlusion task
is too high to induce an effect on an implicit task, and that
this paradigm is therefore not able to determine whether a
consistency effect on a simple implicit task is the result of
perspective-taking or directional orienting.
Conclusions & discussion
The results of these five experiments collectively provide
evidence that differences in stimuli and task demands, and
particularly in perception of the agency and relevance of the
on-screen characters, play a substantial role in mediating the
results of the DPT. That is, when avatars are more humanoid
and realistic, they are more likely to create an altercentric
effect, but only in a task of sufficient visual simplicity; and
when the avatar’s perspective is relevant to the task, it drives
a perspective-taking effect.
Experiment 1 showed that uncued tasks (as predicted)
do not result in altercentric interference; and that explicit
versions of the DPT (Samson et al. 2010; Baker et al. 2016;
Capozzi et al. 2014; Furlanetto et al. 2016; Marshall et al.
2018; Mattan et al. 2015, 2016; Wilson et al. 2017) likely
do provide evidence of visual perspective-taking, rather than
directional orienting. This coheres with our analysis of the
literature as containing discrepant findings based on varying
implementations of the DPT; namely, that explicit tasks find
results consistent with visual perspective-taking rather than
directional orienting.
This “visual perspective-taking” could plausibly be
achieved by different mechanisms – for instance, by
participants spatially representing the dots/discs that are
visible from a certain point in the room, regardless of
what occupies this position; or by representing the visual
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Figure 13. Results of Experiment 5. (A) Mean RT for Behind avatar and Avatar sees conditions; error bars indicate 95% CIs on the
mean of the by-participant means. (B) Each individual participant’s difference between mean Behind avatar RT and mean Avatar
sees RT. Mean reaction time is higher (i.e. participants respond more slowly) for Behind avatar trials (A); a majority of participants
show this effect (B). However, there is no difference in RT between Avatar sees and Avatar faces (central) (C, D) or Behind avatar
and Avatar faces (peripheral) (E, F).
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Table 8. Results of Experiment 5
Slope β SE χ2 df p
Behind avatar vs Avatar sees 0.021 0.005 17.97 1 < .001***
Avatar faces (central) vs Avatar sees −0.0007 0.005 0.03 1 .86
Behind avatar vs Avatar faces (peripheral) 0.003 0.005 0.4 1 .53
perspective of an on-screen figure. The use of a control
condition using non-social stimuli such as arrows, lamps
or cameras in an explicit occlusion task could be useful in
distinguishing between these mechanisms. That is, if there is
a perspective-taking effect on an explicit task for humanoid
stimuli, but not for non-social stimuli, it would suggest
that the effect is driven by perspective-taking specific to
stimuli that represent a human-like perspective. If, however,
a perspective-taking effect is found regardless of stimulus
type, this would suggest a spatial representation effect. It
is important to note, though, that on-screen avatars have no
perspective to represent (they are avatars, not agents), and
so perhaps it should be expected that avatars and non-social
stimuli would show similar results. It is also possible that
spatial representation may be the primary mechanism by
which visual perspective-taking is achieved. This would be
a fruitful avenue for further research.
This visual perspective-taking is not purely stimulus-
driven, instead requiring that participants are motivated to
take the perspective of the avatars throughout the task. Given
this continuous perspective-taking, it seems that participants
maintain awareness of the avatar’s perspective (which is
relevant on some scenes) throughout the experiment (even
on scenes where it is not relevant), and therefore use the
avatar’s perspective as a cue throughout the task. Mean
RT for the explicit condition (720.91 ms) was higher than
implicit (594.37 ms) or uncued (578.00 ms) conditions;
the experiment was not powered to determine whether this
between-subjects difference was statistically significant, but
confirmatory research analysing this would be informative,
as slower responses on an explicit task could indicate
that holding the avatar’s perspective in working memory
is somewhat effortful. The evidence from Experiment 1
suggests that visual perspective-taking should not be
considered automatic, but rather spontaneous, occurring only
when relevant; but may still occur involuntarily and rapidly,
on trials where it is not necessary for the immediate task
(recall that all of our analyses are conducted on trials where
participants are only required to take their own perspective).
Although we predicted that the implicit task in
Experiment 1 would show directional orienting effects, our
results in Experiments 1–3 and 5 failed to match previous
findings of directional orienting in implicit versions of the
DPT (Santiesteban et al. 2014; Cole et al. 2016; Conway
et al. 2017; Langton 2018). Experiments 2 and 3 investigated
whether this could be attributed to (failure to) draw attention
to the avatars by placement of the fixation cross and pre-trial
instructions, or by the greater scene complexity of the stimuli
with multiple barriers, two avatars in different positions,
and up to four balls. In Experiment 2 we used the fixation
cross and instructions to draw attention to the avatar in an
implicit task, and still found no evidence of an altercentric
effect consistent with the avatar driving directional orienting;
the only effect present was better explained by the spatial
distribution of the scene. Likewise, in Experiment 3 we
simplified our scenes and still found no altercentric effect
in an implicit task. However, in Experiment 4, an implicit
task using the original DPT stimuli and otherwise identical
to Experiment 3 did find an altercentric effect, suggesting
an (unanticipated) sensitivity of implicit tasks to the details
of the on-screen characters (that is, cartoon stimuli yield
interference, Lego characters do not).
Because of the simplified stimuli, it is not possible
to determine whether the altercentric effect found in
Experiment 4 was a result of perspective-taking or
directional orienting. We therefore conducted an occlusion
task using the original avatar stimuli, and otherwise identical
to the implicit task in Experiment 1. This task found no
evidence of directional orienting (or perspective-taking),
with the only effect best explained by the spatial distribution
of the scene. This battery of experiments therefore did
not confirm one of our main predictions, which was that
implicit occlusion tasks would produce an altercentric effect
consistent with directional orienting. The greatly increased
visual complexity of Experiment 5 stimuli compared to
previous implicit occlusion tasks (Cole et al. 2016; Conway
et al. 2017; Langton 2018) may explain why we did not find
a directional orienting effect. The unexpected results for the
battery of implicit tasks presented in this paper suggest the
need for future research exploring the variety of ways in
which DPT stimuli may affect the results, and the theoretical
implications of these variations.
Collectively, these five experiments point to a complex
picture of visual perspective-taking, as something occurring
spontaneously in dynamic reaction to the immediate
environment, based on attentional cues. Our Experiment 1
provides evidence that explicit versions of the DPT likely
do provide evidence of visual perspective-taking, rather
than directional orienting. The contrast between explicit and
implicit/uncued conditions suggests that visual perspective-
taking is not purely stimulus-driven, instead requiring
that participants are motivated to take the perspective of
the avatars throughout the task. Visual perspective-taking
should therefore not be considered automatic, but rather
spontaneous, occurring only when relevant.
Our results across all five experiments also suggest
that the visual complexity of the scene and the perceived
agency of the stimuli play a role in driving the appearance
of an altercentric effect, contributing further evidence
that directional orienting is not automatic, and is instead
potentially dependent on the directional cues provided by
the stimulus, or on cues to consider the agent’s perspective
as relevant (albeit not sufficiently to sustain throughout the
task, as in an explicit task). Given this result we emphasise
that a clear distinction should be made between processes
that are automatic and processes that are spontaneous – that
is, not automatic but still rapid, involuntary, and unconscious,
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arising when necessary, as prompted by the attentional
system.
The possibility that perspective taking might be spon-
taneous raises an important theoretical issue. Specifically,
it raises the possibility that directional orienting and per-
spective taking are in fact not cognitively distinct alterna-
tives. Instead there might be more of a continuum between
them, by which directional orienting is a possible input to
perspective-taking, with its effect modulated by attention.
This possibility is an important topic for future research, both
theoretical and empirical. Finally, we note that while the DPT
is proving a fruitful method for exploring questions regarding
visual perspective-taking, our results suggest that caution is
required to interpret results from a range of tasks with widely
varying stimuli and implementation. Given the application of
this task to broader questions about theory of mind (Drayton
et al. 2018; Yue et al. 2017), it is essential to clarify the
precise causes of altercentric interference before using this
task to establish group differences in, or the presence or
absence of, perspective-taking.
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